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Abstract 
 
Constitutions are a key element of the normative script of the modern state. All 
constitutions lock in rights. Most include social provisions. Some are more generous 
than others in this regard. But none come close to the Portuguese Constitution of 1976 
in the length and detail of its list of social and economic rights. Prevailing theories of 
institutional origins have generated hypotheses to account for the constitutionalization 
of second-generation rights. But they fall short of providing a full understanding of 
constitutionalization and the accompanying emergence of judicial review. Outlier 
cases, such as the Portuguese, are even more poorly explained by extant explanations. 
In this article, we test them against the Portuguese case, which, whenever appropriate, 
is compared with Spain. In doing this, we aim at two things: first, to identify 
shortcomings in the most familiar frameworks, theories and hypotheses concerning 
the causal mechanisms leading to the inclusion of social and economic rights in 
constitutions; second, to propose alternative explanations where existing ones prove 
inadequate or insufficient.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Of the 29 countries in the European Union, Portugal stands out for its constitutional 
pre-commitment to social and economic rights.1 Including as many as 29 articles 
spread over 10 pages, the catalogue of social rights in the Portuguese Constitution is 
unique in both its extent and detail. The contrast with other European countries is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   The precise heading of the 1976 Constitution refers to “economic, social and 
cultural rights”. When ranking the level of pre-commitment to social rights in 
Portugal, international studies tend to consider the full list, as most of the rights 
included would today broadly classify as “social”. 
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striking. Some European constitutions, such as those of Austria, the United Kingdom 
and Germany, do not enshrine social rights at all. Most other European constitutions 
do include them. But they vary considerably in the precision with which they are 
defined, in the stipulation of their policy implications, and in the categories of 
individuals they cater to. In all these regards, the Portuguese Constitution is the most 
exhaustive.2 Its exceptional character becomes more apparent when we make a global 
comparison. In a recent 68-country comparative study of constitutional pre-
commitment the Portuguese Constitution emerges at the top.3  
 
Despite the singularity of the case, there has been no study of the origins of 
constitutional social and economic rights in Portugal.4 Political scientists have been 
particularly interested in analyzing the origins of constitutional arrangements through 
methodologies as diverse as large-n comparisons, small-n comparative methods, and 
historically detailed case studies.5 However, even in the latter case, countries such as 
India, South Africa, Israel, Hungary, Canada and New Zealand have commanded 
most of the literature’s attention, and prevailing theories and hypotheses regarding 
social rights constitutionalization and the establishment of mechanisms of judicial 
review have been habitually tested against them.6 This article re-examines the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   Cécile	   Fabre,	   Social Rights in European Constitutions, in SOCIAL RIGHTS IN 
EUROPE 18 (G. de Búrca and B. de Witte eds., 2005).	  3	  Avi	  Ben Bassat and Momi Dahan, Social Rights in the Constitution and in Practice, 
36 J. COMP. ECON. 107, 103-119 (2008).	  4	  An	  exception	  is	  Pedro	  C.	  Magalhães,	  Explaining the Constitutionalisation of Social 
Rights: Portuguese Hypotheses and a Cross-national Test. Draft paper	  (2011).	  5	  Tom	  Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins and Justin Blount, Does the Process of Constitution-
Making Matter?, 5 ANNU. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 201-223 (2009).	  6	  	  On	  India,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Jayna	  Kothari,	  Social	  Rights	  Litigation	  in	  India:	  Developments	  
of	   the	   Last	   Decade,	   in	   EXPLORING	   SOCIAL	   RIGHTS:	   BETWEEN	   THEORY	   AND	  PRACTICE	  171-­‐92	   (Daphne	  Barak-­‐Erez	  &	  Aeyal	  M.	  Gross	  eds.,	  2007);	  Shylashri	  Shankar	   &	   Pratab	   Bhanu	   Mehta,	   Courts	   and	   Socioeconomic	   Rights	   in	   India,	   in	  COURTING	   SOCIAL	   JUSTICE:	   JUDICIAL	   ENFORCEMENT	   OF	   SOCIAL	   AND	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heuristic value of these explanations by means of a detailed analysis of the agents, 
mechanisms, and motives behind the constitutionalization of social and economic 
rights in an outlier case, which stands out in comparative large-n studies – Portugal. 
We further test the robustness of these explanations by contrasting Portugal with 
neighboring Spain.  
 
Constitutionalization of social rights is often presented as being related to the 
background socioeconomic conditions of a country7 or, more specifically, to the 
pressure of powerful clienteles upon constitutional bargaining.8 Sometimes their 
constitutionalization is linked more generally with particular legal traditions, the post-
Second World War zeitgeist, as marked by the ascendency of human rights, and the 
diffusion of a more egalitarian notion of democracy.9 But the most influential theory 
of the origins of constitutional social rights sees them as the product of a seemingly 
paradoxical pre-commitment, which eliminates some policy options from political 
actors’ opportunity set, while committing them to considerable future public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ECONOMIC	   RIGHTS	   IN	   THE	   DEVELOPING	   WORLD	   146-­‐182	   (Varun	   Gauri	   &	  Daniel	  M.	   Brinks	   eds.,	   2008);	   on	   the	   South	   African	   experience,	   see,	   e.g.,	   Eric	   C.	  Christiansen,	  Adjudicating	  Non-­Justiciable	  Rights:	  Socio-­Economic	  Rights	  and	   the	  
South	   African	   Constitutional	   Court,	   38	   COLUM.	   HUM.	   RTS.	   L.	   REV.	   321	   (2007);	  Marius	   Pieterse,	   Possibilities	   and	   Pitfalls	   in	   the	   Domestic	   Enforcement	   of	   Social	  
Rights:	  Contemplating	  the	  South	  African	  Experience,	  26	  HUM.	  RTS.	  Q.	  882	  (2004);	  on	   the	   Israeli	   case,	   see,	   e.g.,	   Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial 
Empowerment through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Israel's Constitutional 
Revolution, 32 COMP. POL. 315 (2001); on Canada, Israel and New Zealand, see 
Ran Hirschl, "Negative" Rights vs. "Positive" Entitlements: A Comparative Study of 
Judicial Interpretations of Rights in an Emerging Neo-Liberal Economic Order, 22 
HUM. RTS. Q. 1060 (2000).	  7	   See,	   e.g.,	   ROBERTO	   GARGARELLA,	   Grafting	   Social	   Rights	   onto	   Hostile	  
Constitutions,	  89	  TEXAS	  L.	  J.	  1537,	  1538	  (2011).	  8	   See,	   e.g.,	   EVELYNE	   HUBER & JOHN D. STEPHENS, DEVELOPMENT AND 
CRISIS OF THE WELFARE STATE. PARTIES AND POLICIES IN GLOBAL 
MARKETS (Chicago University Press 2001).	  9	  See,	   e.g.,	   RONALD	  DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (Harvard University Press 1996).	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spending.10 The resolution of this paradox is said to lie in the self-interested nature of 
this “tying of hands”.11 The reasoning here is that partisan politics around institutional 
solutions aims at producing distributional consequences which are beneficial for 
parties acting as strategic actors. Hence parties which lock in social rights in 
constitutions might do so with a view to enhancing their chances of obtaining or 
maintaining office, either by creating or simply responding to welfare-clienteles, or by 
deflecting difficult decisions to the judiciary.12 Others have claimed that the locking-
in of social rights in constitutions is not so much strategic as primarily aimed at 
protecting them from the harmful desires of future majorities. This view contrasts 
with the equally common functionalist thesis that constitutionalized social rights are 
the expression of distrust of government by experts and of the intention to limit the 
discretionary power of the state.13 Finally, there are those who regard the enshrining 
of social rights in constitutions as reflecting the ideological convergence of different 
parties on the desirability of an active welfare state, or, alternatively, of these parties’ 
exploitation of social rights’ strategic symbolism.14  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	   See,	   e.g.,	   JON	   ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS: STUDIES IN THE 
LIMITATION OF RATIONALITY (Cambridge University Press 1989).	  11	   For	   the	   notion	   of	   “credible	   commitments”,	   see	   DOUGLAS	   NORTH,	  
INSTITUTIONS,	   INSTITUTIONAL	   CHANGE	   AND	   ECONOMIC	   PERFORMANCE	   46	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press	  1990).	  12	  See, e.g., Terry Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J. of 
Law, Econ. and Org. 213 (1990); JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL 
CONFLICT (Cambridge University Press 1992); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS 
JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (Harvard University Press 2004). 13	  See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, Path Dependence, Precedent and Judicial Power, in 
ON LAW, POLITICS AND JUDICIALIZATION 112-135 (A. S. Sweet and M. 
Shapiro eds., 2002); Martin Shapiro, Towards a Theory of Stare Decisis, in ON LAW, 
POLITICS AND JUDICIALIZATION 90-102 (A. S. Sweet and M. Shapiro eds., 
2002).  14	  See, e.g., Evelyne Huber, Charles Ragin and John D. Stephens, Social Democracy, 
Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State, 99 AM. J. 
SOC. 711 (1993); JAMES J. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING 
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These hypotheses underpin our study of the origins of constitutional social and 
economic rights in Portugal in 1975-76. This case was selected according to the 
“outlier cases” principle, which suggests that if existing explanations fail to account 
for a given historical outcome, then the likelihood of having other explanations 
accounting for it increases. Typically, in outlier cases the values on the dependent 
variable (entrenched social rights, in this case) are especially high, while the 
prevailing explanations fail to account for it.15 In our analysis we adopt a process-
tracing approach, in an attempt to identify the complex causal relations linking a 
hypothesized cause or causes to the outcome of the dependent variable.16 To this end 
we draw on a wide range of primary source materials, from party manifestos and 
constitutional projects, to the public debates on social rights in the Constituent 
Assembly, and interviews with some of the chief actors in the constitution-making 
process.  
 
The above-listed hypotheses on the origins of constitutional social and economic 
rights shape the structure of this article, the main purpose of which is to assess their 
strengths and weaknesses against the Portuguese case, while also generating new 
hypotheses that account for constitutionalization in this and similar cases.17 We begin 
with a brief historical overview of the Portuguese constitution-making process 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS (The Free Press 
1989); HIRSCHL, supra note 6.	  15	  Ran	  Hirschl, On the Blurred Methodological Matrix of Comparative Constitutional 
Law, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 58, 39-66 (S. Choudry 
ed., 2007).	  16	  James Mahoney, Revisiting General Theory in Historical Sociology, 83 Soc. Forces 
459, 464 (2004).	  17	   Peter A. Hall, Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics, in 
COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 373-404 
(J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer eds., 2003).	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(section 2). Next we look into background conditions for constitutionalization, both 
socioeconomic (section 3) and legal (section 4), and use the comparison with Spain to 
uncover unobserved contextual variables and processes whereby these conditions 
translated into two very different outcomes in each of these countries. In section 5, we 
establish whether the “partisan politics” hypothesis is helpful in explaining the 
entrenchment of a vigorous charter of social welfare rights in Portugal, while also 
alerting the reader to some “functionalist fallacies” in which it can incur. We then 
assess the “ideological convergence” explanation for rights’ constitutionalization by 
scrutinizing the nature of the constitutional settlement (section 6). Finally we examine 
the “thin” and “thick” versions of the “realist” strategic explanation for judicial 
empowerment through rights’ constitutionalization (section 7).  
 
 2. The 1976 Constitution and its Origins 
 
The Portuguese constitution-making process figures in this article less for its inherent 
historical interest than for its relevance as a case study to review and expand on 
existing hypotheses on the origins of constitutionalized social welfare rights. Before 
we proceed to the analysis of these hypotheses, however, it is important to bear in 
mind the main steps of this process and the main factors conditioning it. First among 
these are the sudden collapse of the previous regime, the power vacuum it created, 
and the generalization of political struggle that ensued. On April 25 1974 a bloodless 
left-wing military coup, led by junior officers, overthrew the 48-year old right-wing 
authoritarian regime known as “Estado Novo”. Generating spontaneous popular 
support, the “Carnations Revolution” marked the beginning of a rocky transition to 
democracy, under the tutelage of the military, who were themselves divided between 
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a majority radical faction of the revolutionary left and the moderates. The political 
program drafted by the Movement of the Armed Forces (MFA), as the group of 
emergent officers came to be known, provided for the creation of a military-run Junta 
of National Salvation (JNS). Together with a military-appointed provisional 
government, this Junta was charged with organizing free and fair elections for a 
constituent assembly within no more than a year. As the country plunged into political 
and social turmoil, with the far-left factions leading the revolution, it was increasingly 
doubtful whether the constitutional process would go ahead. A failed anticommunist 
countercoup in March 11 1975 led to the military’s political institutionalization as a 
sovereign Council of the Revolution and gave a new boost to their aim of establishing 
a “Socialist democracy” through popular revolution. It was a time of uncertainty, but 
elections for the constituent assembly eventually took place on April 25 1975. The 
turnout was staggering (91%), and the resounding victory of the moderate parties 
(Socialists, 37.9% and Popular Democrats, 26.4%) was accompanied by a landslide 
defeat for the Communists (12.5%). The election provided the backdrop for an 
ongoing clash between the electoral legitimacy of the nascent parties and the popular 
revolutionary legitimacy claimed by the radical military and the Communist Party. 
The constituent assembly began its works at the height of radical leftist dominance, 
and met for roughly one year. Its works were constrained by a pact imposed on all 
parties by the Council of the Revolution days before the election.  
 
Besides determining the need for a quasi-homologation by the military of the 
constitutional text approved by the constituents, the pact required the constitutional 
formalization of the political, social, and economic conquests of the revolutionary 
process. The commission on social rights met between August and October 1975, 
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with plenary debates on this issue taking place in the tumultuous late summer of 1975. 
This saw Portugal on the brink of civil war, with ideological-political struggle and 
social movements taking to the streets, and the political and military radical-left 
condoning a wave of purges, strikes, housing, land, and factory occupations. As the 
perceived cleavage between “revolution” and “constitution” deepened, constituents 
worried about the disbandment of the assembly. But despite the assembly’s “siege”, 
works continued.18 On November 25 an attempted radical-left military coup was 
successfully deterred by a countercoup of the military moderates, with the balance of 
power shifting decisively in the latter’s favor. The following April the constitution 
was approved by six of the seven parliamentary parties, its exhaustive charter on 
social rights having been approved previously, in October 1975, by unanimity. We 
now turn to the question of how well prevailing theories and hypotheses on the 
origins of constitutional social rights explain this outcome.  
 
3. Socioeconomic conditions 
 
The socioeconomic conditions and the legal traditions of a country are often given as 
explanations for the inclusion of social rights in its constitution. These factors are 
structural in nature, and are taken to shape the conduct of political agents by defining 
the general parameters or background conditions within which they operate. Analysts 
typically aim at determining the nature, scope and relative strength of these factors to 
produce explanations that seek to establish a causal relation between them and 
individual outcomes. For instance, if one is able to group individual outcomes in 
categories that match the predictable impact of these external factors, a causal relation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	   In	   November	   1975	   the	   assembly	   was	   literally	   under	   siege	   for	   24	   hours	   by	  construction	  workers	  with	  suspected	  ties	  to	  the	  Communists.	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between them is suggested. Applying this logic to constitutional social rights, the 
hypothesis is often raised that the more severe a country’s socioeconomic conditions, 
as measured by its GDP per capita, 19 the more likely it is to lock social rights in the 
constitution.20  
 
There is a general problem with this type of approach however. The statistical 
methods used to estimate the average net effect of factors such as socioeconomic 
conditions fall short of identifying the reasons why, and the processes whereby, they 
produce the effects they do. In the absence of the establishment of a meaningful 
connection between factors and effects, whether the purported association implies true 
causation, or is dependent on a further, unidentified explanatory variable, to produce 
the identified effect, remains unsettled. To dig deeper into this question of factors as 
mere conditions or as causes, one must seek to account for outcomes by elucidating 
the mechanisms that generate them.21  
 
To establish this, we proceed to tracing and comparing the reasons why actors 
involved in two contemporaneous constitution-making processes, despite facing 
similar macro-socioeconomic conditions, arrived at two very different treatments of 
social rights in their constitutions: the Portuguese Constitution of 1976 and the 
Spanish Constitution of 1978, both of which are still in force. In selecting these two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  See,	  e.g., Bassat and Dahan, supra note 3, who use GDP per capita as a control 
variable; Magalhães, supra note 4, at 33, who similarly makes use of GDP per capita 
as a control variable in his analysis of the Portuguese case.	  20	   Christopher Whytock, Constitutional Pre-Commitment to Social and Economic 
Rights 14. Draft paper (2004). Available upon request. 21	  S.N. EISENSTADT, THE GREAT REVOLUTIONS AND THE CIVILIZATIONS 
OF MODERNITY (Brill 2006); JACK GOLDSTONE, REVOLUTION AND 
REBELLION IN THE EARLY MODERN WORLD (University of California Press 
1991).	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countries, we follow the “most similar cases” principle of research design:22 i.e., by 
comparing cases that have similar background socioeconomic conditions but vary in 
the dependent variable – the level of constitutional pre-commitment to social rights – 
we seek to hold constant non-key variables, while isolating our main independent 
variables.  
 
Both Iberian countries lived under rightwing dictatorships from the 1930s, made their 
transition to democracy in the mid 1970s, and underwent democratic constituent 
processes less than two years apart. In Portugal the Constituent Assembly worked 
between July 1975 and April 1976, whereas in Spain the Cortes, the two houses of the 
Spanish parliament, wrote the current Spanish Constitution between August 1977 and 
December 1978. At the time of the constitutional writing, the socioeconomic 
conditions in the two countries were fairly similar. Both countries had undergone 
comparable periods of robust economic growth in the decades preceding their 
democratic transitions, although this economic performance was partly a “statistical 
illusion”.23 In 1973 Iberia was still Western Europe’s poorest region and one of its 
most unequal. The oil crisis of that same year, and the economic recession that 
followed, dealt a devastating blow to the Iberian economies, contributing significantly 
to the fall of the respective dictatorial regimes.24 Insofar as the socioeconomic 
conditions were poor, and worsened on the eve of their democratic transitions, this 
would lead us to expect a high level of constitutional pre-commitment to social rights 
in both countries.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  See,	  e.g.,	  Ran	  Hirschl, supra note 15, at 40-51.	  23	  Kenneth	  Maxwell, The Thorns of the Portuguese Revolution, 54 Foreign Aff. 250, 
254 (1976).	  24	  Rafael Durán Muñoz, A Crise Económica e as Transições para a Democracia: 
Espanha e Portugal em Perspectiva Comparada, 23 Análise Soc. 369-401 (1997).	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Similar in their socioeconomic standing, Portugal and Spain arrived, however, at two 
very different solutions in terms of constitutional pre-commitment to social rights. 
Whereas the Portuguese Constitution enshrines a huge amount of social rights, and 
conceives them as fundamental subjective individual rights, the Spanish Constitution 
does not have a section on social rights as such. The language of rights as subjective 
entitlements is dropped in favor of a vague language of principles. These are directive 
principles, “governing the social and economic policy” (Chapter 3, Part I), whose 
status comes across as merely declaratory. As to the demands constitutional social 
provisions impose on future governments, the contrast between the Portuguese and 
Spanish constitutions is again striking. In the Spanish Constitution social provisions 
are defined cursorily and governments given an extremely broad range of discretion 
regarding their effectuation.25 In its turn the Portuguese Constitution describes each 
social right in excruciating detail and calls for the creation of the institutions of 
welfare necessary to their implementation (i.e., a national health service, a social 
security system and a national education system). In addition, it lays down the 
fundamental principles underlying the founding of these institutions (e.g., 
universality, generality, freedom of charge) as well as their internal organization 
(decentralization, representativeness, participation). Besides locking in details of 
social policy, the Portuguese Constitution specifies a mechanism of judicial review 
for social rights – unconstitutionality by omission (Article 279). The Spanish 
Constitution adopts a more diffuse formula: “Recognition, respect and protection of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  This is clear e.g. from the formulation of the right to health (Article 43): “It is 
incumbent upon the public authorities to organize and watch over public health by 
means of preventive measures and the necessary benefits and services”. 
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the principles recognized in Chapter 3 shall guide legislation, judicial practice and 
actions by the public authorities” (Article 53, Chapter 4, Part I).  
 
Socioeconomic conditions per se are not sufficient to account for these differences. 
As we saw, at the time of constitutionalization the economic situation was similar in 
both countries. To explain why the constitutional settlements diverged, one has to 
look into possible explanations of why socioeconomic conditions were activated into 
reasons for strong pre-commitment to social rights in one country and not the other.  
 
Legal innovations require legal innovators: people who adduce arguments for, and 
make choices as to the scope and extent of constitutional transformation. These 
choices are constrained by the structure of opportunities and the limits it poses on the 
kind of constitutional choices that might gain the acceptance of the relevant 
audiences. The process of transformation of conditions into causes must therefore be 
primarily understood as a political process that is contextually contingent, and whose 
distinctive nature in Portugal and Spain, we submit, was strongly determined by the 
nature of their democratic transitions – revolutionary in the first case, “pacted” in the 
second.  
 
In Portugal the military coup originated a process that is best characterized as a 
rupture than as a transition. From the political program of the military, which was 
given constitutional force right after the coup,26 to the final text of the constitution, 
the purpose of enshrining non-market notions of social justice is apparent. The poor 
socioeconomic conditions of the Portuguese, and the need to address them through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Law 3/74, May 14. 
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social welfare, are priorities explicitly established both by the military and by the 
constituents.27 Given the tutelary powers of the military, and their support of social 
movements denouncing those conditions outside the assembly, one could be led to 
assume that the constituents were merely giving in to pressure when thematizing 
socioeconomic conditions as reasons for ensuring a progressive catalogue of social 
rights. But if the revolutionary hope of dramatic social change created a vigorous 
sense of constraint as to the range of legitimate constitutional choices, it would be 
wrong to infer that they configured a constitutional vision at odds with the vision of 
the political parties. Party constitutional projects exhibited a substantive commitment 
to social welfare programs designed to address the relative deprivation of the 
population. They knew the legitimacy of the constitutional settlement depended on its 
capacity to break with a past of “undeserved misery” (an expression much in use at 
the time), and realize a democracy that was not simply procedural, but intent on 
meeting the material needs of the population. The first sign of this break was to 
protect the expectations of the population by entrenching a vast catalogue of social 
welfare rights as effective citizenship entitlements imposing coercive orders on future 
governments, rather than lofty promises, depending on their goodwill.  
 
In Spain the transition to democracy was evolutionary, and the constituent process 
counted on the participation of important sectors of the authoritarian regime. 
Although socioeconomic conditions provided a salient electoral theme in the 1977 
elections to the Cortes, they failed to play a central role in the ensuing political 
struggle over the country’s new constitution. Other more divisive themes, separating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	   See	   MÓNICA	   BRITO	   VIEIRA	   &	   FILIPE	   CARREIRA	   DA	   SILVA,	   O	   MOMENTO	  CONSTITUINTE	  (Almedina	  2010),	  at	  126-­‐31.	  The	  complete,	  unedited	  version	  of	  the	   constituent	   debates	   of	   1975-­‐76	   is	   available	   at	   the	   Portuguese	   Parliament	  website:	  http://debates.parlamento.pt/catalog.aspx?cid=r3.dac	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the conservative religious right from the secular republican left, captured the 
constituents’ agenda, such as divorce, abortion, the death penalty, electoral law, 
regional autonomy and the role of the Church in the education system, none of which 
proved easy to settle.28 The Spanish Cortes were consumed by widely divergent 
positions as to the extent to which the new constitution should effect a break with the 
authoritarian past, and exhaustive bargaining over deep-seated cleavages. As a result, 
social rights were remained in the shadow, with the lack of firm commitment to them 
translating into the strategic use of ambiguity.  
 
In Portugal, by contrast, political cleavages were being built anew upon the premise 
of a radical break with the past. Some of the main cleavages dividing parties (e.g. the 
architecture of political institutions and the economic model) were very deep, but 
subdued during the constitution-making process to appease the military, and reopened 
only post-1976. On other issues a broader agreement on the desirable terms of the 
break with the past facilitated a relatively consensual settlement, even when 
disagreement over specifics persisted.29 All political forces blamed the authoritarian 
regime for its incipient investment in welfare provisions, and for the neglect of the 
needs of society’s most vulnerable groups – workers, orphans, women, children, the 
elderly, fishermen, rural laborers, or, more generally, the poor. The constituents drew 
sharp lines between the regime of social provisions under authoritarian rule and under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	   Richard Gunther, Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain, in 
REDESIGNING THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
IN INDUSTRIAL NATIONS 51-54 (Keith Banting and Richard Simeon eds., 1985). 
29 See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism, 1 
INT’L J. CONS. L. 298, 299-300 (On a similar, more general claim about positive 
and negative models of constitution-making). 
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the new democracy.30 First, there was the distinctive conception of social security, 
health care and education as fundamental rights of citizens, creating a duty on the 
state for their provision, rather than mere charitable provisions. For instance, the 
universal and obligatory nature of the new social security system was contrasted with 
its optional nature under “Estado Novo”. The idea that beneficiaries of the system 
should be “provident”, and not expect the state to care for their future, was replaced 
with the notion that it fell on the state to cover risks and to secure social provisions. 
Besides being more generous, social entitlements should also be given emancipatory 
purposes. Social rights were no longer conceived simply as a form of satisfying the 
needs of the Portuguese, for purposes of social control, but as an instrument of 
progressive politics: in a constituent’s words, as a “way for the state to redistribute 
wealth for those who need it the most”.31 Virtually all constituents agreed that 
“Estado Novo” calamitously failed to realize social justice. Until 1974, constituents 
observed, the state had been both unwilling and unable to take responsibility for 
social welfare provision, and to put it at the service of progressive notions of 
redistributive justice. Welfare services chronically lacked financial, human and 
technical resources to implement even residual policies, and were expected to back up 
the status quo. The new constitution was to change all this. The welfare services were 
to be generous and emancipatory, both stimulating and benefiting from the active 
agency of their beneficiaries.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	   The emphasis on the idea of a break with the past was reinforced through the 
obliteration of any positive social policy developments in the latter years of the 
previous regime, namely the reform of 1962, and in particular with the efforts of 
construction of a “social state” by Salazar’s successor, Marcelo Caetano. See Manuel 
de Lucena, Transformações do Estado Português nas suas Relações com a Sociedade 
Civil, 23 ANÁL. SOC. 897 (1982); Victor Pereira, Emigração e Desenvolvimento da 
Previdência Social em Portugal, 44 ANÁL. SOC. 471 (2009).  
31 Martelo de Oliveira, PPD. 
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If the Portuguese constituents deliberately acted as legal innovators, mobilizing 
background conditions to erect a new welfare politics, they were not alone in their 
transformative effort. There were also pressure groups involved in promoting the 
welfare interests of a generally deprived population, whose mobilization contributed 
to the shaping of constitutional law. This was especially true of medical doctors.32 
Moved by their concern with the limitations of the private healthcare market and by 
progressive leftist ideals, physicians were a leading force in social welfare policy 
reforms. In 1975, while the Constituent Assembly debated the right to health, a 
healthcare service to the periphery was created. This consisted in a one-year 
deployment of training polyclinic physicians to impoverished rural areas.33 Alongside 
this service, medical doctors created health centers in the main cities, which would 
become the embryo for the local units of the future national health service. Therefore, 
in medical doctors we find therefore a leading occupational group, whose support for 
the constitutionalization of a national health service made itself felt in the works of 
the assembly and in the constituents’ views about what the social constitution ought to 
mean.34  
 
4. Legal traditions 
 
Alongside socioeconomic conditions, legal traditions are often used to explain the 
inclusion of social rights in constitutions. The so-called “legal origins” hypothesis of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	   See, e.g., F.A. GONÇALVES FERREIRA, HISTÓRIA DA SAÚDE E DOS 
SERVIÇOS DE SAÚDE EM PORTUGAL (Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian 1990); 
CONSTANTINO SAKELLARIDES, DE ALMA A HARRY. CRÓNICA DA 
DEMOCRATIZAÇÃO DA SAÚDE (Almedina 2005). 
33 MÁRIO JORGE NEVES, A SAÚDE, AS POLÍTICAS, E O NEOLIBERALISMO 
23-4 (Sindicato dos Médicos da Zona Sul/FNAM 2006). 
34 Both as an external pressure and internally, as at least one of the constituents 
integrating the committee on social rights was a medical doctor.	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Rafael La Porta and his collaborators centers on the economic effects of legal 
institutions35 through the categorization of countries according to their legal origin: 
e.g., it is hypothesized that countries whose legal systems have a common law origin 
emphasize freedom of contract and the protection of private property, whereas 
countries with civil law roots tend to favor a more active redistributive role for the 
state. In order to render this hypothesis empirically verifiable, La Porta suggests the 
use of dummy variables such as “English”, “French”, “German”, “Scandinavian” and 
“Socialist” legal traditions to account for “legal origins”.36 The application of this to 
social rights constitutionalization is straightforward: common law countries are 
expected to be less likely to constitutionally pre-commit to social rights than civil law 
countries.37 But this correlation still explains very little, and tells us virtually nothing 
about the variance of time, scope and nature of social rights constitutionalization 
within the same legal tradition.  
 
Both Portugal and Spain, for instance, have a “French” legal origin,38 which can be 
traced back to the Napoleonic Code of 1804, and the French invasion of the Iberian 
Peninsula shortly afterwards. Moreover, there was a migration of constitutional ideas 
between the two Iberian states from this period onwards.39 However, there is no 
identifiable influence between the section on social rights of the Portuguese 
Constitution of 1976 and the Spanish Constitution of 1978. Only the Spanish 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Rafael	  La Porta et al. The Quality of Government, 15 J. L. ECON. ORG. 222-79 
(1999). 36	  Rafael	  La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, The Economic 
Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285-332 (2008).	  37	  See,	   e.g.,	   David	   S.	   Law	  &	  Mila	  Versteeg,	  The	  Evolution	   and	   Ideology	   of	   Global	  
Constitutionalism,	  CAL.	  L.	  REV.,	  Vol.	  99,	  2011;	  Washington	  University	  in	  St.	  Louis	  Legal	  Studies	  Research	  Paper	  No.	  10-­‐10-­‐01,	  1243,	  1163-­‐1254	  (2011).	  	  38	  See,	  e.g.,	  Magalhães,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  23.	  39	   Zachary	   Elkins, Diffusion and the Constitutionalization of Europe, 43 COMP. 
POL. STUD. 969 (2010).	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Communist Party (PCE) took inspiration from the Portuguese Constitution, when 
proposing, without success, a lengthy catalogue of social rights, and insisting on the 
incorporation of constitutional mechanisms for their effectuation.40 The fact that it is 
only a left-inclined Spanish party that takes the Portuguese Constitution for 
inspiration reflects the different ideological positioning of the two Iberian party 
systems. Emerging from a left-wing revolution, the Portuguese party system was born 
confined to the left-hand of the political spectrum, whereas the Spanish reflected the 
“pacted nature” of the transition: it was more ideologically spread out and the main 
forces leaned towards the center.  
 
The most immediate legal sources of the Portuguese Constitution reflect this 
ideological alignment. Some of the sources were more politically sensitive, reflecting 
ideological cleavages between political forces; others were more consensual and 
reflected the neutralizing influence of legal experts over the constitution-making 
process.41 First among the latter, was the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights of 1966, of which Portugal was one of the first signatories.42 The 
Covenant itself added a socialist perspective on rights to the traditional liberal 
emphasis on civil and political rights. Portuguese parties, with their leftist and/or 
social Catholic inspiration, entrenched a similar commitment to the indivisibility or at 
least the necessary interdependence of first and second-generation rights. The specific 
formulation of socioeconomic rights diverged, however, from that of the Covenant in 
its more prescriptive approach, an attempt to break with the authoritarian practice of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	   Rafael Vallejo Pousada, Estado y Economia en la España Democrática, 1975-
1999, 9 HIST. Y POL. 159, 165 (2003). 
41 Although there are no specific numbers for the constituent assembly, legal experts 
represented roughly 24% of MPs in the 1976 legislative assembly. 
42 The Covenant entered into force January 1976, and Portugal signed it in October.  
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failing to give the constitution practical effect, and in its explicit use of socialist 
terminology. This comes as no surprise: the political program of the military was one 
of the sources of the constitution, and Eastern European constitutions, such as the 
Yugoslavian, figured in the electoral program of the Socialists as a model for the 
Portuguese “original route to socialism”. Other Communist bloc constitutions worked 
less as sources than as sites of political struggle. This was the case with the 1936 
Soviet Constitution, also known as the “Stalin Constitution”. Its Article 118 made the 
right to work dependent on the collective appropriation of the means of production 
and a centrally planned economy. This was partly poured into the first article of the 
constitutional section on social rights, in a forced concession of the moderates to the 
revolutionary left. Christian and Popular Democrats used the plenary debate to voice 
their outrage at the effectuation of social rights being made conditional on 
collectivization and central planning. The discussion over the article was heated,43 but 
it made it to the constitution unchanged, as Article 50. This would fall victim to the 
first constitutional amendment in 1982, as the tutelage of the military terminated and 
democratic politics normalized. 
  
These miscellaneous and sometimes contending legal sources resulted in occasional 
legal innovations. This was the case with the explicit consecration of social rights as 
universal, but also as targeting the emancipation of workers and the protection of 
some of the most vulnerable groups in society, defined more ambitiously than in the 
1976 International Covenant, and ahead of future covenants, as children, the youth, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  MÓNICA	  BRITO	  VIEIRA	  &	  FILIPE	  CARREIRA	  DA	  SILVA,	  supra	  note	  27,	  at	  285-­‐93.	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the elderly and people with disabilities (Articles 69 to 72).44 The break with the 
corporatist past, where social entitlements belonged to some and were dependent on 
their occupational affiliation, was thereby made clear, but not always subsequently 
delivered, with sub-systems created under the authoritarian regime surviving to this 
day.45 	  
Constituents argued for these legal innovations in the floor debates. Many of their 
arguments did not have an articulate doctrinal base. They were rather advanced 
through emotional testimonial accounts, with constituents putting themselves in the 
shoes of vulnerable groups, whose experience they sometimes shared.46 A case in 
point is the intervention of Martelo de Oliveira, a Popular Democrat constituent, 
brought up in a state asylum. He felt legitimized in speaking on behalf of “all of those 
who, after having given all their efforts to society, were marginalized and thrown in 
the bin”. These were people now receiving their deserved “recognition from 
Portuguese society” through its fundamental law.47 Raised from their second-class 
citizenship by the new political covenant of the country, they were finally put on a par 
with, and bound to, all others by ties of mutual recognition. The “we the people” of 
the Portuguese Constitution was a claim about a reunified people yet to be, which the 
Constitution was already enacting.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The Indian Constitution of 1948 includes special social provisions for some of these 
groups, but, from the interviews conducted as well as the analyzed debates, it does not 
seem to have been a source for the Portuguese constituents.  
45 For a critical assessment of the survival of particular occupational regimes of social 
security and health care as unconstitutional “remains of corporatism”, see Vital 
Moreira, one of Portugal’s most prominent constituents and constitutional law 
scholars, in Público, 9-5-2006. 46	  See	  MÓNICA	  BRITO	  VIEIRA	  &	  FILIPE	  CARREIRA	  DA	  SILVA,	  supra	  note	  27,	  at	  73-­‐81.	  47	  See	  MÓNICA	  BRITO	  VIEIRA	  &	  FILIPE	  CARREIRA	  DA	  SILVA,	  supra	  note	  27,	  at	  117.	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This type of empathetic representation was essential in toning down ideological 
dispute and in generating platforms of agreement on specific formulations of social 
rights. However, in most accounts of the origins of constitutional social rights it 
would go unmentioned or discounted as vacuous rhetoric. This happens because 
discourse is rarely considered a form of agency and in the dominant rational choice 
explanations for constitutionalization the motivations of the agents are aprioristically 
conceived as strategic, in which case empathetic representation, and the narratives it 
generates, would be read as mere plebiscitary rhetoric. As became clear from our 
empirical analysis, however, real political behavior is often a more complex mix of 
beliefs about the legitimacy of different solutions, commitments, loyalties, emotions, 
solidarities, as well as strategic goal-directness. The aprioristic association of 
purposeful action, or action in search of an end, with a framework of utility 
maximization, risks overlooking a set of motivational factors that are critical in 
explaining political behavior in constitutional revolutions, especially where 
coinciding with social rupture. Empathetic concerns, understood as things we care 
about, or aspects of the situation that present themselves as reasons for or against 
action, have an especially compelling motivational force in these situations, both 
motivating action and figuring “in the justification of action or the norms that guide 
it”.48  
 
5. The Partisan Electoral Market Thesis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  For the notion of “concern”, see SAMUEL BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONS. 
A THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASONING (Oxford University Press 1999). For 
the role of empathetic concern in deliberation about justice, see SHARON KRAUSE, 
CIVIL PASSIONS. MORAL SENTIMENT AND DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION 
(Princeton University Press 2008). 
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However, rational choice approaches dominate comparative constitutionalism, and 
their conception of agency contrasts with the expanded notion of agency delineated 
above.49 Its most influential hypothesis for the constitutionalization of social rights 
portrays agents as preference maximizers and emphasizes the competitive nature of 
partisan politics. Accordingly, political actors, as strategic actors, want to establish 
institutions that optimize their preferences. They evaluate their options in light of their 
benefits and costs, and pursue the option that is most likely to maximize the 
difference between the two, given the constraints faced. Constitutional pre-
commitment to social rights is therefore expected to be at its highest when it 
maximizes the preferences of the political actor dominating the constitution-making 
process.  
 
To test this hypothesis against the Portuguese case we need to unpack it into three 
related questions. First, which political actor(s) dominated the constitution-making 
process (5.1.)? Second, was the optimization of their preferences their primary mover 
or can we devise better alternative explanations for why they acted the way they did 
(5.2. and 5.3.)? Third, to what degree were constituents bound by the politics of 
partisanship (5.4.)? The remainder of this section searches for answers to these 
questions.  
 
 5.1. Main political actors 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	   See, e.g., ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES. 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE (Oxford University Press 2000). 
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The answer to the first question must be sought in the nature of the transition and the 
outcome of the election for the constituent assembly. Endowed with revolutionary 
legitimacy, the military was a key player in the constitution-making process. Days 
before the election for the constituent assembly, they forced the parties to sign a pact 
concerning the general ideological content of the constitution. This pact also 
established their overseeing of constitutional works and their requirement of being 
heard after the constitution’s approval by the parties, in what amounted to a quasi-
homologation. Given the ideological proximity of the militaries’ ruling faction to the 
Communists, and the latter’s growing control over unions, media, and the provisional 
government, the politico-military revolutionary left was an undoubtedly dominant 
force. But to their surprise, the struggling moderate political parties emerged from the 
election as a political force to contend with. The electoral result changed the balance 
of power and the dynamics of the transition. The Socialist Party, which came out as 
the dominant party, holding 116 of the Assembly’s 250 seats, bore the brunt of the 
anti-Communist struggle outside the assembly and the leading political role within it. 
But since the Constitution needed approval by at least 126 constituents, this was not a 
one-party assembly.50  
 
 5.2. Partisan politics in action  
 
Having established that there were two main contenders to the position of dominant 
political actor, the military and the Socialist Party, we now turn to the testing of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The Popular Democrats (PPD) secured 81 of the 250 seats; the Communist Party 
(PCP) held 30 seats; the Christian Democrats (CDS) won 16 seats; and MDP/CDE, a 
satellite party for the Communists, held 5 seats; the two remaining left revolutionary 
parties summed between them 2 seats. 
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so-called “electoral market thesis”.51 This suggests that when the political actor 
dominating the constitution-making process expects to lack control over future 
legislatures, constitutional entrenchment may emerge as a way to protecting its 
preferences.52 This explanation seems to fit the Portuguese case, insofar as there was 
no single core of post-authoritarian political power, and the military, in particular, 
could anticipate their future withdrawal from political institutions as well as electoral 
losses for the radical left party with which they were ideologically closest to, the 
Communist Party.53  
 
 5.2.1. Partisan politics I: the military 
 
The military’s political program, which gained constitutional status straight after the 
coup, did not speak of social rights as such, but it did pre-commit to a “new social 
policy” for the “defense of the interests of the working classes” and the urgent 
“improvement of the quality of life of the Portuguese”.54 Parties were constrained by 
these guidelines in drafting their constitutional projects. However, if in other subjects 
(e.g., the political institutions and the model of the economy) the military constraint 
openly ran against the parties’ more moderate constitutional preferences, this does not 
seem to have been the case with social rights, where the constitutional visions of the 
military and the moderate parties were more attuned. This has consequences for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts, J. LEG. STUDIES 23 
(1994). 
52 PEDRO MAGALHÃES, THE LIMITS TO JUDICIALIZATION: LEGISLATIVE 
POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN THE IBERIAN 
DEMOCRACIES, PhD Dissertation (2003). 
53 The pact signed between military and parties set a deadline for the amendment of 
the constitution within three to five years, and in 1982, when the amendment took 
place, the military were effectively excised from the political system. 
54 Political Program of the MFA, April 1974.	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explanatory value of the electoral market thesis. If the entrenchment of social rights 
provided “insurance” to both prospective electoral losers and prospective electoral 
winners that their policy preferences would be secured, therein must lie the reason for 
the durability of the Portuguese charter of social rights. As to the electoral market 
thesis, whose most common formulation presupposes the oppositional nature of the 
“insurance” (that the dominant constitutional actor insures its preferences against 
other actor(s) by forcing constitutionalization), it fails to explain the dynamics of 
constitutional entrenchment in this case.  
 
 5.2.2. Partisan politics II: the parties 
 
If the military were not an electoral player as such, the other dominant political actor, 
the Socialist Party, was. Applying the electoral market thesis to them, the question 
arises: Can the vigorous constitutional entrenchment of social rights be attributed to 
the Socialists and interpreted as their way of strategically locking-in their policy 
preferences in answer to the interests of the groups and constituencies on which they 
electorally depended?  
 
First there is the question of attribution. The drafting of the Constitution began with 
the submission of constitutional projects by the political parties. These projects were 
the basis for the work of drafting committees, specializing in different sections of the 
Constitution, in which parties were represented according to their electoral weight. 
The Socialist Party favored the inclusion of a progressive charter of social rights in 
the Constitution, and the draft emerging from the committee closely adhered to the 
Socialist’s project.  
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Does this mean that in pushing for the constitutionalization of social rights the 
Socialists were protecting their policy preferences against different preferences 
exhibited by other parties? The constituent moment was one of great party 
polarization, with parties vigorously engaged in shaping partisanship outside the 
assembly. However, the objective of enshrining the institutions of an active welfare 
state crossed partisanship lines. That much is clear from the parties’ constitutional 
projects. In all of them social rights were not only present, but were also roughly the 
same. All projects stated these rights with an almost equal precision, and detailed the 
institutions and policies required for their effectuation. If in some cases the 
ideological convergence between parties’ constitutional projects was explained by the 
external military constraint (e.g., the commitment of future policy-makers to 
collectivization and a socialist classless society), when it comes to social rights the 
military emphasis on the need for a new social policy found echo in the belief systems 
and policy positions of the parties, even if for different reasons, and to a different 
extent. This was proved retrospectively by the fact that where forced consensus 
prevailed, the constitutional settlement was questioned the moment the military lost 
their bargaining power: namely, in the first constitutional amendment, in 1982. By 
contrast, the charter on social rights survived the change in the balance of forces, 
remaining virtually untouched up to now. If path dependency, “dead law”, and 
strategic symbolism partly account for its resilience, widespread party support for the 
desirability and legitimacy of constitutional social rights offers a far more plausible 
account of these rights’ political origins, and explains much, if not all, of their 
durability.  
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Returning to the electoral market thesis, once one specifies the Socialists’ interests 
strictly in terms of partisan politics, it becomes doubtful that electoral concerns were 
the driving force behind their support for social rights. The doubt arises not because 
the Socialists faced no uncertainty about the prospect of dominance in future 
elections, and therefore did not feel the need to win the electorate with promises, such 
as the constitutional promise of an expansion in social benefits. Electoral uncertainty 
was undoubtedly there. But the fact that the Socialists faced no serious challenge with 
which they needed to compromise when pressing for the constitutionalization of 
social rights was public knowledge, and further made known in the plenary debates. 
This put the “politics of partisanship” on hold: i.e., there was no room for the 
Socialists to create a relevant electoral cleavage around the issue of social welfare in 
the forthcoming April 1976 general election (which they won by relative majority, as 
they became the protagonists of the anti-Communist fight for democratic 
normalization).55  
 
The electoral variant of the partisan politics thesis faces yet a final challenge, both 
conceptual and empirical. One might be tempted to claim that in their decision to 
entrench social rights the Socialists were influenced by the preferences of their 
constituencies and by organized interests who understood the politics of institutional 
choice, and made demands or exerted pressure accordingly. Behind this view of 
legislative politics lies a particular model of representation: premised on the 
exogeneity of preferences, it takes a principal-agent format, and presupposes a linear 
dyadic model of influence, which moves from the expressed preferences of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 The general elections were to take place a mere three weeks after the Constitution’s 
final approval. 
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constituencies and/or interest groups to the preferences of legislators.56 The suitability 
of this model of representation to normal politics is under question.57 We submit that 
its adequacy to constituent politics is, if anything, more doubtful, especially when 
transitions from authoritarianism to democracy coincide with the reintroduction of 
party competition amongst newly formed parties.58  
 
The rationale is simple. Constituencies and preferences do not emerge directly from 
social divisions, nor gain consistency apart from the partisan politics in which they 
are formed. Rather they are co-construed, and need for their existence to be 
interpreted, represented, personified, and even dramatized, by social movements and 
political actors. In other words, they are endogenous to the political process, and 
cannot serve as basis for party responsiveness, because they do not have the 
independent causal import normally assigned to them.59 If this is generally the case, it 
is all the more so when a party system and constituencies are being formed anew, as 
was the case in Portugal after the revolutionary break. The emergent parties – all but 
the Communist Party – did not have strong social roots or traditional constituencies. 
They were rather tentatively searching out and actively constructing them in 
competition with one another.  
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   ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND 
REPRESENTATION (Cambridge University Press 1999).	  57	  DAVID RUNCIMAN & MÓNICA BRITO VIEIRA, REPRESENTATION (Polity 
Press 2008); Jane Mansbridge, A “Selection Model” of Political Representation, 17 J. 
POL. PHIL. 369 (2009); Lisa Disch, Toward a Mobilization Conception of 
Democratic Representation, 105 AM. POL. SC. R. 100 (2011). See also David 
Plotke, Representation is Democracy, 4 CONSTELL. 19 (1997).	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   ZACHARY	   ELKINS,	   TOM	   GINSBURG	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   MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF 
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (Cambridge University Press 2009).	  59	    Jeff Manza & Fay Lomax Cook, A Democratic Polity? Three Views of Policy 
Responsiveness to Public Opinion in the United States, 30 AM. POL. RESEARCH 
630, 657 (2002).	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Despite their affiliation with the Socialist International and the European Social 
Democrats, the ideological template of the Socialists was broad, and included 
distinctively Marxist and utopian Socialist elements. On the eve of the election, they 
were unsure about their electoral base. Their proposed policies and discourse were 
clearly leftist, but their anti-Communist stance found them important support from 
constituencies more to the right. To convince voters on the one side, without losing 
those on the other, was to strike a fine balance. Their process of representation, like 
that of the other newly formed parties, had a distinctively generative and anticipatory 
quality: they were competing to shape the preferences of future voters by making 
representative claims in which they would hopefully see themselves retrospectively 
mirrored. In this process, they were hardly influenced by cohesive, let alone 
organized, constituencies; social movements “colonized” by the radical left; or 
pressurized by interest groups, namely welfare clienteles. Social welfare under the 
dictatorship had been so incipient that these clienteles were embryonic at best. 
Moreover, the self-declared purpose of all parties was to replace the corporatist 
welfare system, which molded any extant embryo-clienteles along occupational lines, 
with a universal welfare system, which eliminated them, and, the moderate parties 
insisted, ought to co-exist with the right to private property. In light of this, the 
hypothesis that the party dominating the constitutional process was strategically 
responding to the pressures of pre-established constituencies or interest group policy 
preferences when locking-in social welfare rights does not fare particularly well when 
applied to Portugal.  
 
 5.2.3. The functionalist fallacy 
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It would be even a greater stretch to suggest, from a functionalist perspective, that the 
Socialists were in a position to determine ex ante that constitutional pre-commitment 
to social rights was to advance their chances of obtaining, and keeping, office in the 
medium and long terms, namely by generating welfare-clienteles that could cement 
their electoral hegemony. This would presuppose their command over legislatures 
responsible for erecting the welfare state, implementing welfare programs and 
policies, and distributing social benefits. In 1976, however, the newly formed parties 
did not – and could not – foresee the evolution of their electoral performance in the 
medium and long terms. This meant they could not be sure whether it would be them 
or their competitors who would be in a position to claim the initiative for widening 
welfare provision. The situation was of great uncertainty, and further enhanced by the 
unpredictable role of the president and the adopted proportional electoral system, not 
least for the Socialists, who faced no possibility of coalition to the left, and no 
“natural” coalition to the right. The sense of uncertainty proved correct: between 1976 
and 1983, there were no less than eight governments, some formed by the President, 
all of them short-lived, minoritarian, and integrating different political forces. Any 
strategic electoral projections were, therefore, virtually impossible in 1975.  
 
This is not to say, however, that there were no beneficial long-term bargains stricken 
by the “tying of hands” that the constitutional pre-commitment to social rights 
imposed. But that actors pursuing a strategy of constitutionalization could foresee 
these bargains is doubtful. Only with time would it become apparent that Portugal 
was evolving into a two-party system, with the two major parties, the Socialists and 
the Popular Democrats, rotating in power. Eventually, the Communists and the 
Socialists started claiming the paternity and the guardianship of the “social 
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Constitution” and the protective job market it created. As the welfare state expanded, 
public sector employees and other welfare-clienteles became increasingly important 
constituencies for the Socialists, the only ruling party of the two, and the potency of 
the language of constitutional rights came into increasing use for making political 
claims on the left of the political spectrum. To this day, the entrenchment of rights to 
social provisions continues to have a significant impact on the dynamics of party 
competition, with political debate often being drawn back to the relative positioning 
of different parties vis-à-vis social rights. Given the weight of welfare clienteles, the 
mere suggestion that a party might be equating the retrenchment of social rights from 
the constitution can be electorally very costly.60  
 
 5.3. The nature of the assembly 
 
There is a further reason why the partisan politics thesis might fail to explain the 
constitutionalization of social rights in Portugal: its “thin” strategic understanding of 
politics does not capture the dynamics of constitution making in the assembly as 
reconstructed from primary sources materials, notably interviews with constituents.  
 
The interaction between constituents was heavily conditioned by both the nature and 
the “status” of the assembly. Let us start with the nature. The Portuguese constituent 
assembly was a quasi-sovereign body, directly elected by a staggering 91% of the 
population, which would not be heard in the constitution’s ratification. Endowed with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 In the 2011 general election, the Popular Democrats drafted a project of 
constitutional revision, which touched upon some of its social rights. This prompted 
an immediate outraged reaction from left-wing parties and the opinion polls were so 
penalizing that the project was soon abandoned. For the critical reaction of Jorge 
Miranda, the Social Democrat “founding father” of the Portuguese constitution, see:  
http://www.dn.pt/inicio/portugal/interior.aspx?content_id=1662348 
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constitutional-making powers, the assembly was to be dissolved once its constituent 
mission was over, with some of its prominent members not presenting themselves for 
re-election. The exceptional character of the assembly contributed significantly to its 
partial insulation from partisan politics and normal political decision-making.  
 
The contrast with Spain is instructive. Because in Spain “legal continuity” prevailed, 
the Spanish “constituent” assembly was a bicameral legislature, elected on the basis 
of a “Law for Political Reform” passed by the last Franquist Cortes for a normal 
legislature lasting beyond the making of the constitution. In Spain, therefore, 
constituents were also normal MPs, with high stakes in post-constitutional politics, 
and the constitution-making process was more deeply embedded in partisan politics, 
and highly permeable to the pressures of organized interest groups, most notably the 
Catholic Church. The constitutional negotiation process was so divisive in Spain that 
it came to a stalemate, and a new decision-making procedure had to be adopted: 
constitution-drafting was delegated to a small group of representatives of the two 
main parties, who stroke difficult compromises, amid hard bargaining, behind the 
closed doors of a Madrid restaurant. 
 
Different in nature, the “constituent” assemblies were also different in status. Whereas 
in Spain the Cortes had the country’s attention and were the epicenter of political 
struggle, in Portugal the constituent assembly was taken to be a mere sideshow to the 
radicalizing revolutionary process outside. As the Socialist leader at the time puts it, 
there was a widespread belief that the “essential of the political battle” was to be 
“waged in the streets, factories and politico-military conspiracies to which this period 
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was prone”.61 This marginalization of the assembly, together with the impeding 
menace of its disbandment, resulted in its relative insulation from the yoke of partisan 
polarization and in socialization between constituents across party lines. The marked 
difference between how constituents acted on the floor and behind closed doors 
attests to this. The moderate parties used publicity moments as an outlet for their 
grievances against the revolutionary left provisional governments and for messages 
addressed to the military. The plenary debates, in particular, were taken as an 
opportunity to demarcate themselves from aspects of the constitutional settlement 
they would eventually be forced to agree to, whilst ideologically at odds with, as well 
as to demarcate themselves from one another before their targeted constituencies. Out 
of the limelight, in the committees, plebiscitary rhetoric gave way to a more 
cooperative stance. Constructive compromises were facilitated by the “neutralizing” 
influence of legal experts representing different parties, whose “projects” and 
proposals would sometimes succeed in “trumping” those with a clearer party 
“mark”.62 
 
The relative insulation of drafting committees from partisan polarization was 
reinforced by their freedom from excessive party leadership interference. Although 
this did not necessarily apply to the radical left, their parties being more centralized 
and hierarchical, constituents representing moderate parties benefited from a freer 
mandate. Their most prominent members acted as trustees rather than mere delegates 
of the party’s leadership. Although there were party coordination mechanisms in 
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  MÁRIO SOARES, SOARES I: DITADURA E REVOLUÇÃO 442 (Círculo de 
Leitores 1996).	  
62 This was the case with the project on the organization of political power, an 
especially delicate issue, presented by Jorge Miranda, an eminent constituent and 
constitutional scholar from the Popular Democrats. 
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place for each parliamentary group, these mechanisms were loose and allowed for 
considerable freedom of action, negotiation, deliberation and compromise within the 
committees. Constitutional writing could therefore be somewhat creative, especially 
where the military guidelines were looser.  
 
Besides benefiting from the relative insulation of the Assembly vis-à-vis politics 
outside, constitutional settlement on social rights also benefited from its falling 
between two highly divisive issues, on which political struggle concentrated. First, 
there was the question of the relative positioning of social rights with regards to civil 
and political rights, with the moderate parties insisting, against the revolutionary left, 
on the logical, normative and historical priority of the latter over the former. Second, 
there was the question of the relation of social rights to the country’s economic 
system, with the Communists making social rights dependant on the collectivization 
and central planning of the economy, and thus seeking to place the sections of the 
Constitution on economic organization and social rights before that on civil rights. 
Questions of relative priority, as reflected in the discussion of the different regimes of 
civil and social rights’ legal and judicial protection, rather than the charter of social 
rights as such became the centre of ideological divergence. As a result, the entrenched 
list of social rights became a kind of “mixed bag”, into which the utopian expectations 
of a poor country, undergoing a social revolution, were more or less freely poured. 
The symbolic value of social rights for a Constitution in search of its legitimacy was 
widely acknowledged, and far from negligible: they were the written proof that the 
social meaning of the revolution was not to be lost, but realized, as the country moved 
towards democratic normalization. 
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 6. Ideology  
 
Although the literature on social rights constitutionalization tends to focus on the 
partisan politics of structural choice, this politics may also be commanded by 
ideological commitments. Thus, the thesis follows that if the dominant actors in the 
constitution-making process share a particular ideology, they are likely to use the 
constitution to lock in policies that are based on that ideology. Was this the case in 
Portugal? 
 
The section on social rights was eventually approved by unanimous vote. However, 
this tells us very little still about the nature of the consensus reached, which, we shall 
argue, threaded a middle ground between a mere modus vivendi and a full-blown 
ideological consensus.63  
 
Rather than trying to maximize their constitutional benefits in proportion to the force 
of their electoral mandate, the moderate parties, led by the Socialists, were intent on 
minimizing the risks of a worst-case scenario: i.e., giving the revolutionary left 
reasons to abandon the constitutional process. Forging a workable constitutional 
settlement – not necessarily the settlement they would have most wanted, but one 
with which all the parties were able and willing to live with64 – within a reasonable 
deadline was therefore at the top of their priorities. Continuous tinkering risked 
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   See, e.g., Stylianos-Ioannis Koutnatzis, Social Rights as a Constitutional 
Compromise: Lessons from Comparative Experience, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
74 (2005). 
64 Though parties were not always sure of this, with e.g. Popular Democrats 
expressing concern for being unable to develop their own policies if they won the 
elections within the framework of such a prescriptive constitution, namely in its 
economic model.   
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leading the country into civil war. This is why the committee’s project on social rights 
sought to reflect the balance of power between various political forces, bringing 
together articles from different party projects roughly in proportion to their electoral 
mandate. In some cases this represented a significant concession on the part of the 
Socialists to views radically to the left or (in fewer cases) significantly to the right of 
their ideological stance and policy preferences. 
 
If the menace of radicalization pushed for some sort of modus vivendi, it would be 
wrong to reduce the parties’ commitment to constitutional social rights to a strategic 
affair. Their support for social rights, and the constitutionalization of guarantees of 
social provision, sprang primarily from the parties’ origins in ideological doctrines 
traditionally favoring an active welfare state. Born out of the last left-wing revolution 
in Europe, the nascent Portuguese party system confined itself to the left extreme of 
the political spectrum. Whilst decidedly distanced from the Communists, and their 
orthodox Marxism, the Socialists espoused some Marxist and utopian socialist beliefs, 
and shared the European Social Democrats’ deep commitment to progressive social 
welfare rights and an interventionist welfare state. The second largest party, the 
Popular Democrats, was a centrist-social democratic party, bringing together Social 
Democrats, Liberals and some Christian-Democrats, while the Christian Democrats 
were a more conservative party. On both these parties, however, the influence of 
Catholic social thought was strong, and explained their commitment to market social 
regulation and a distributive welfare state, intent on protecting human dignity and 
well-being.65 It was from these multiple and sometimes (albeit not always) 
intersecting ideological families, that each party drew principled reasons to commit to 
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social rights as essential to break away from the social injustices of the past and set 
social cooperation on new and fairer terms.  
 
But profound ideological divergences subsisted, namely over the historical meaning 
and the desirable ways of implementing these rights. If for the radical military and the 
Communists social rights were those conquered by the working classes from the 
bourgeoisie, Popular Democrats eschewed the Communists’ historical materialism in 
favor of an idealist reading of social rights as the historically necessitated partner to 
civil and political rights. Different understandings of the genesis of social rights 
resulted in different understandings of their meaning: as human rights for the parties 
more to the right; as citizenship rights for the Socialists; as workers’ rights for the 
Communists. This had implications for their implementation. Communists wanted 
workers and their families to be the chief beneficiaries of the welfare system, whose 
funding should fall on other classes. Socialists granted social rights universally, but 
put them at the service of a strongly redistributive politics. Popular Democrats saw 
social rights as reformist measures designed to benefit workers and the poor alike, 
within the framework of a non-state controlled economy, while also reminding other 
parties that “workers” included small property and business owners. Ideological 
disagreement extended also to the institutions responsible for welfare. Whereas for 
Communists and Socialists the provision of welfare belonged to the state as the 
collective agent of popular emancipation, Popular Democrats and Christian 
Democrats insisted that welfare was primarily a social responsibility binding each to 
every other member of society. Hence the delivery of social provisions ought to be 
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secured by state and civil society alike (especially the Catholic Church), a partnership 
on which the liberty of the person from the state depended.66  
 
In the face of these and other disagreements, the agreement of all parties to the 
articles on social rights could have been achieved by carrying them to a high level of 
abstraction or by settling on loose formulations, as would happen in Spain. Instead, in 
Portugal, social rights and their implementation mechanisms were constitutionalized 
in excruciating detail. In face of unresolved dissensus, parties were able to agree on 
detailed individual provisions by following essentially two routes. An avoidance 
strategy, whereby especially contentious formulations and unnecessarily divisive 
elaborations of the rationale behind the rights were voiced in the debates, but kept 
away from the written word of the Constitution. This was complemented by the 
decision of keeping ideological tension within the Constitution, with social rights 
showing a double framing, within the Socialist-Marxist constitutional model imposed 
by the military tutelage and a less prevalent, but important, western model, infiltrated 
by the moderate parties.67 An example of this is the incorporation in the section of 
articles at odds with it, and with one another: e.g., one making social rights dependent 
upon the collectivization of means of production and central planning of the economy 
(Article 50), the other affirming the right to private property (Article 62). This 
tendency to incorporate, without necessarily integrating conflicting ideological views, 
supporting social rights from very different value perspectives, has given the 
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   Despite the insistence of Popular and Christian-Democrats no mention to the 
Catholic Church and its role in fields such as education entered the constitution. 
67 For the Socialist-Marxist framing of the 1976 constitution and social rights, see 
Articles 1, 2, 9, c), 10, 50 and 80. For western liberal elements key to the 
interpretation of social rights, see Articles 81, a), 1 (reference to the dignity of the 
human person); 9, c) (reference to promotion of wellbeing); 62, n. 1 and 2; 85, n.1; 
89, n.4; 16, n.2.  
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Constitution its notorious “baroque” flair,68 and an intrinsic plasticity, making it 
possible to salvage most of the charter of social rights as the country progressed 
towards democratic normalization. Prominent jurists were key to this:69 they 
influenced jurisprudence in devaluing the Socialist-Marxist aspects of the constitution 
when interpreting social rights and their implementation, thus opening the way to the 
de-Marxization, as it were, of the original framing of social rights, in the first 
constitutional amendment, and to its replacement with a new, and more mainstream 
social Catholic “value base”: namely, the dignity of the human person and solidarity. 
 
7. Strong rights, weak courts 
 
The staggering expansion of constitutional social rights in the 1976 Constitution 
coincided with a very significant increase of the powers of judicial review.70 In this 
last section, we examine two variants, “thin” and “thick”, of the dominant hypothesis 
for the constitutionalization of rights and the establishment of judicial review: the so-
called strategic realist hypothesis.71  
 
The “thin” version of this hypothesis relates to the “electoral market thesis” discussed 
earlier (section 5.2.). This thesis submits that judicial empowerment occurs as an 
“insurance strategy” when actors dominating the constitutional-making process 
anticipate loosing control over future legislatures. It predicts that where the design of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	   Jorge Miranda, A Constituição de 1976 no Âmbito do Constitucionalismo 
Português, in PORTUGAL. O SISTEMA POLÍTICO E CONSTITUCIONAL 1974-
1987, 630, 609-46 (M. B. Coelho ed., 1989). 
69  Namely, the constituents Jorge Miranda (PPD) and Vieira de Andrade. 
70 The “Estado Novo” Constitution of 1933 somewhat surprisingly attributed to courts 
the power of judicial review, which remained largely unused however.    
71 HIRSCHL, supra note 12, at 40. 
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judicial review occurs in a context of uncertainty and in which no single political 
actor dominates, judicial review will be constitutionalized in moderate terms and in a 
way that prevents any single political actor from enjoying control over how 
constitutional rules will be interpreted. By contrast, the more the constitution-making 
process is dominated by a single actor anticipating no control over future legislatures, 
the more strongly this actor will seek to entrench his powers of constitutional review. 
 
For proponents of this hypothesis, like Pedro Magalhães, the difference between 
situations one and two explains the difference between constitutional review powers 
in the Spanish and Portuguese Constitutions of 1978 and 1976, respectively.72 In 
Spain the constitutional process was not dominated by a single political actor, 
therefore judicial review was designed to prevent its control by any single political 
force. In Portugal, by contrast, the military was in command, and fearful of losing 
control over future legislative elective institutions, they would have imposed on 
parties the incorporation of both social provisions and a strong military guardianship 
over the implementation of those provisions into the constitution.73  
 
This appears to offer a suitable explanation for the pact imposed by the military on 
parties on the eve of the constituent assembly’s election, whereby they claimed for 
themselves broad jurisdiction: the power to ask the constitutionalization of a “new 
social policy” and to “determine, with general binding force, the constitutionality of 
future laws”.74 The truth, however, is that the basis for the constitutionalization of 
judicial review was to be, not this first pact, but a second pact, signed in the aftermath 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  MAGALHÃES,	  supra	  note	  51.	  73	  MAGALHÃES,	  supra	  note	  51,	  at	  41.	  74	  First	  Platform	  of	  Constitutional	  Agreement,	  April	  13	  1975.	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of the military countercoup of November 1975. This radically shifted the balance of 
power in favor of the moderate forces, both military and political, and further shook 
the military’s status as single dominant political actor.75 Such a tectonic movement of 
forces had immediate consequences for the pact, and forces us to reconsider 
Magalhães’ streamlined interpretation of the application of the “thin” electoral market 
hypothesis to the Portuguese case. 
 
In the aftermath of the coup, judicial review was renegotiated between military and 
parties on a more equal footing. The parties submitted proposals, ranging from the 
radical left’s support of absolute military control over judicial review to the proposal 
by the parties on the right to extinguish the Council of the Revolution, and to replace 
it with a Council of the Republic or State, with a strong civilian component, on which 
control over judicial review was to be conferred. In their counterproposal the military 
continued to claim broad jurisdiction, including a priori and a posteriori abstract 
review of legislation and the right to declare unconstitutionalities by omission when 
legislatures failed to implement constitutional rules, amongst them social rights. In 
case of unconstitutionality by omission, they reserved the power to issue 
recommendations to legislatures, and, where legislatures did not abide by them, to 
take their place in order to ensure implementation. This was a daring proposal that 
faced resolute objection by moderate parties, and did not enter the constitution. 
 
The military seemed to be pursuing a strategy well above their powers. Yet when one 
examines the origins of this innovative idea of unconstitutionality by omission, it 
becomes clear that it sprang from an enthusiastic small group of legal experts, closely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  One sign of this was that they power of homologation of the Constitution was 
dropped in the second pact. 
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tied to the Socialist Party, which was advising the military.76 Legal experts were 
especially sensitive to the need for a break with a past in which judicial review had 
been ineffective, and much of the constitution “dead law”. The willingness to render 
efficacious new constitutional commitments which were not immediately applicable, 
such as those to social rights, had weak expression amongst Spanish parties, but was 
clearly a matter for concern amongst members of the “Socialist” legal and military 
elite in Portugal, and can partly explain the strength of the review mechanism 
ultimately proposed by the military to parties. The collaboration between military and 
legal experts resulted in yet another crucial institution, this time checking the power 
of the military. In the exercise of their review powers, they had to pay heed to a body, 
whose composition (a majority of legal experts, many of them judges known for their 
conservative leanings) was designed to grant impartiality and technical expertise to 
the militaries’ rulings. This was the Constitutional Commission, and was conceived 
by the legal experts advising the military as the embryo of the future Constitutional 
Court.  
 
What emerges from this account is no longer a single dominant actor, uncertain about 
the electoral future and using their current force to secure the guardianship of the 
constitution. Instead, we have a circumstance-imposed collaboration between 
ideologically attuned elites to find a more balanced constitutional solution, in which 
the Socialists (not to speak of the other moderate parties), knowing of the transitory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  These were Miguel Galvão Teles and Luís Nunes de Almeida. The sources for 
“unconstitutionality by omission” are disputed. Some suggest it was the Yugoslavian 
Constitution of 1974. But in Miguel Galvão Teles’s account, the constitution being so 
new, they had no knowledge of it, the source being most probably a legal doctrine, of 
an Italian origin. In any case, the mechanism was thought to be a legal innovation. 
Miguel Galvão Teles, A Segunda Plataforma de Acordo Constitucional entre o MFA 
e os Partidos Políticos, in PERSPECTIVAS CONSTITUCIONAIS NOS 20 ANOS 
DA CONSTITUIÇÃO DE 1976 (Jorge Miranda ed., 1996). 
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nature of the settlement on judicial review, conceded more than they would have 
wanted, to gain the goodwill of the winning moderate military in the interim.  
 
When recognizing that the constitutional settlement on judicial review resulted from 
the interplay among legal innovators coming from dominant elites, we seem to be 
moving into the ground of the “thick” strategic explanation for judicial empowerment 
through constitutionalization. This is known as Ran Hirschl’s “hegemonic-
preservation thesis”, and it explains the constitutionalization of rights and judicial 
review as the byproduct of the strategic interplay between hegemonic elites – 
political, economic and judicial, threatened by widening representation and 
democratization. They are said to pay lip service to social and economic rights, while 
attempting to insulate policy-making from the vicissitudes of democratic politics, 
which can seek to promote progressive notions of distributive justice potentially 
disadvantageous to the status quo.  
 
Hirschl calls his thesis “thick”, because it takes into account the worldviews, belief 
systems, and policy preferences informing the elites and political struggle.77 But it is 
exactly when these other dimensions are taken into consideration, in research that, 
like ours, draws on primary sources, such as interviews and contemporaneous 
materials, that Hirschl’s thesis begins to run into problems: in Portugal the ruling elite 
was, for the most, new and progressive, rather than conservative; driven by a leftist or 
Catholic social reformist agenda; and genuinely committed to the use of social rights 
to produce significant redistributive and power-diffusing effects.  
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  HIRSCHL,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  42.	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Drawing on a limited range of cases, all located in the Anglo-Saxon common law 
tradition, and deriving the elites’ intentions directly from their “elite” standing, 
Hirschl arrives at an explanation for the constitutionalization of rights and the 
establishment of judicial review with claims to generality, but this faces decisive 
temporal, geographic and cultural constraints, all of which remain insufficiently 
specified.78 The examination of the Portuguese case, an outlier case, has enabled us to 
bring to the fore some of these limitations. 
 
Inferring the motives for constitutionalization from subsequent restrictive patterns of 
judicial interpretation of social rights, one could easily be led to believe that there was 
a conservative agenda in place from the start in Portugal. But this would be to falsely 
read history backwards. The Portuguese Constitutional Court, responsible for many of 
those restrictive rulings, was not created before 1982, when the first constitutional 
amendment was passed. As the partisan politics thesis would predict, parties sought to 
frame the Court after their own preferences, and to avoid the unpredictable influence 
of the President of the Republic. While the centre-right wanted to pack the court with 
members of higher echelons of the judiciary, for their conservative inclination, the 
Socialists proposed a more mixed composition, of higher and lower rank judges, and 
members of parliamentary and presidential appointment. The hard bargaining and 
incapacity of either side to impose its preferences on the other led to a settlement that 
retained the broad powers of judicial review inherited from the past virtually intact. It 
also relocated them to a Constitutional Court for which the leftist and rightist blocks 
would appoint an equal number of judges, with a further judge, co-opted by ordinary 
judges, breaking the tie between them. In other words, now that the settlement on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  For	  a	  similar	  criticism,	  see	  CARLOS	  CLOSA	  review	  of	  Ran	  Hirschl’s	  TOWARDS	  JURISTOCRACY,	  4	  INT’L	  J	  CON	  LAW	  581-­‐86	  (2006).	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judicial review had a longer time frame, and the military were gone, each main party 
of the centre-right and the centre-left made sure that the other would not have 
complete control over the constitution’s future interpretation, as the “thin” strategic 
thesis would predict. If the equal say of the two main parties, Socialists and Social 
Democrats (the former Popular Democrats), in the composition of the court led to 
immediate accusations of its being a “political court”, in which legislatures would be 
judging in their own cause, the understanding of party negotiators was rather that 
whereas the Court’s composition was perfectly predictable, its perfect internal balance 
plus the existence of a casting vote of the co-opted third judge made its rulings 
unpredictable to either bloc.  
 
Experience tells us otherwise: the Constitutional Court has eschewed protagonism and 
acting as a contra-majoritarian force. Its rulings regarding social rights, in particular, 
have been few and self-restrained. While the political analyst would probably be 
warranted in seeing this as a by-product of the alignment of beliefs and policy 
preferences between political and judicial elites, legal experts tend to attribute the 
conservative character of the rulings on social rights to the weakness of the 
mechanism of judicial review and the dominant influence of German legal doctrine. 
Seen as cutting-edge at the time of its creation, and subsequently targeted by center-
right parties as purely political, unconstitutionality by omission survived the first 
constitutional amendment, and is seen today as a weak judicial guarantee.79 Besides 
depending on the pre-existence of a constitutional affirmative duty to legislate, citizen 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	   Mark	   Tushnet discusses unconstitutionality by omission in Portugal as an 
especially weak-form review (of the kind he favors), which relies on legislatures to 
enforce constitutional norms and without “any serious enforcement mechanism”. 
MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS 156 (Princeton University 
Press 2009).	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access to it is indirect, and its enforcement mechanisms residual. All that the 
Constitutional Court does is to inform the legislature of the unconstitutionality; then it 
must wait for the legislature to act and give it efficacy. Unsurprisingly 
unconstitutionality by omission has been found in a handful of cases, only one 
relating to social rights.80 The weakness of the judicial guarantee is reinforced by the 
dominance of German legal doctrine. Whereas the Portuguese Constitution entrenches 
social rights and the duties of the state in realizing them in detail, social rights do not 
even figure in the German Constitution, only the principle of a Social State does. Yet 
Portuguese justices seem more receptive to claims of unconstitutionality founded 
upon notions extracted from German doctrine than from the letter of the Portuguese 
Constitution.81 The justices of the Constitutional Court tend to leave a wide margin of 
discretion to executives and legislatures, leaving them judgment of the options that 
best secure the financial sustainability of the welfare system and the fair distribution 
of resources. Eventually, the prescriptive and progressive character of the social rights 
originally invested in the constitution came to be filtered by their restrictive 
interpretation. But to take the Court’s reasons as the rationale for social rights and 
judicial review constitutionalization in revolutionary Portugal would be more than 
mere anachronism: it would blind us to the fact that conservative outcomes can have 
progressive origins.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 To be precise, six under the Constitutional Commission, and seven under the 
Constitutional Court, with only one referring to a social right (unemployment 
benefits).  
81 For instance, the notions of “social minimum”, “essential content”, “prohibition of 
stepping backwards” and “derived rights”. 
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Taking the origins of social rights and judicial review seriously in comparative 
constitutional law implies critically surveying the theoretical, methodological and 
interpretive choices that currently inform their study, and the hypotheses these 
background choices generate. The outlier case analyzed in this article using a process-
tracing approach allowed us to test the limits and expand the possibilities of extant 
explanations.  
 
Theoretically, we have exposed the shortcomings of the application of analytical 
models devised for the study of “normal politics” to the study of the “extraordinary 
politics” of constituent moments coinciding with revolutionary change.82 Our case 
study presented several constraining factors that made the models of “normal politics” 
far less helpful in explaining social rights’ constitutionalization and that might not be 
exclusive of the Portuguese case. Chief amongst these factors were the military 
tutelage and ensuing ideological constraining of the politics of partisanship; the 
prevalence of worst-case scenario avoidance over preference maximization; the scale 
of uncertainty faced by political actors; the absence of consolidated constituencies 
and/or clienteles; the associated difficulties of strategic prediction; and the 
preponderance of a politics of ideological confrontation, about and sometimes having 
its epicenter on issues adjacent to social rights, over a partisan politics of institutional 
choice.  
 
The concurrence of these factors is unlikely to repeat itself, but at least some of them 
will play out in other constitutional making processes, such as those prompted by the 
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  These included principal-agent models of political representation as well as a “thin” 
model of politics limited to the partisan electoral market and the search for preference 
maximization.	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Arab Spring. There, like in 1975 Portugal, constitution making originated from 
political and social revolution, and constituents are, in many cases, bound to work 
with two sources of legitimacy (electoral and revolutionary) and the aspirations of 
two audiences in mind: the military and the people who took to the streets.83 To make 
sense of how this impacts upon the politics of constitutionalization one needs to 
expand the conception of politics underpinning the explanation of entrenched social 
rights beyond the realm of institutional party politics to include agonistic forms of 
extra-institutional politics, notably those relating to social movements. Their role in 
influencing constitutional law by offering, and acting according to, alternative 
constitutional visions, is frequently significant, and calls for a more dialogical 
understanding of constitution making.  
 
The standard political science strategic modeling of the interaction between political 
forces involved in constitution making tends to turn a blind eye to these societal 
forces as well as to the specific nature and dynamics of the process of constitutional 
change and the constituent assembly itself. Yet as our analysis of the Portuguese case 
suggested, it might be impossible to explain why social rights enter the constitution 
the way they do without considering aspects such as these. The stages of the 
constitutional process and the different actors involved in them (e.g., the formulation 
of proposals, their pre-negotiation, and the eventual submission to popular ratification 
of the new constitution); the nature of the assembly (e.g., revolutionary or elected; 
directly-elected or indirectly-elected; sovereign, quasi-sovereign, or non-sovereign; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	   In March 2011, a Portuguese delegation, including constitutional law experts and 
politicians, was invited by authorities leading the Tunisian transition to democracy, to 
discuss the constitution, the constituent assembly, and state reform in the country in 
the light of the Portuguese historical experience. See, e.g., 
http://www.kapitalis.com/fokus/62-national/3143-tunisie-la-transition-democratique-
mode-demploi-.html 
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constituent assembly, ordinary parliament or constitutional expert commission); its 
organization and composition (e.g., ratio of legal experts, their influence, and 
distribution amongst parties); its internal processes and behavioral dynamics; and its 
level of insulation from normal partisan politics, are important dimensions to take into 
account when searching for the origins of social rights. Different institutional settings, 
with different levels of insulation from partisan politics, might allow for different 
types of constitutionalism and to a different treatment of social rights: more 
technocratic, in some cases; more aversive and defensive, in others; and more freely 
aspirational, in others still. 
 
Methodologically, our study pointed out to the dangers of interpreting social rights 
constitutionalization after a conception of human agency that restricts it to some 
limited a priori set of motivations, and reduces constitutionalization to a form of self-
interest. The hermeneutic or interpretative strand of historical analysis we adopted 
allowed us to capture a broader range of motivations behind the willingness to protect 
social rights constitutionally. Questions of time and of located agency were integral to 
our inquiry into primary sources – How did political actors conceive of themselves? 
How did they see their historical role? How did they construe the past and the future 
society they were enacting? All of these questions proved essential to determining 
whether the origins of social rights and judicial review in Portugal were benevolent 
and progressive or primarily strategic and conservative.  
 
The question of the actors’ time horizons proved decisive for yet another aspect of our 
analysis. Most constituent assemblies drafting a wholly new constitution act after a 
revolutionary change of some kind. Under these circumstances, political actors cannot 
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rely on the operation of well-institutionalized contexts to frame their options and 
structure their actions. At several points of our study, we saw how easy it would have 
been to misread the causes of social rights and judicial review constitutionalization by 
ascribing unrealistic prescient mid- and long-term bargaining projections to the actors 
leading the constitutional process. Yet this would have compounded the functionalist 
fallacy of taking the fact that institutions are doing something for political actors as 
explaining their creation.   
 
As the welfare state developed in Portugal, social welfare provisions did indeed 
become functional – albeit arguably by different measures – to the two ruling parties, 
who have sought support of welfare clienteles and control over the composition of the 
Constitutional Court reviewing the implementation of social rights. It would be 
misleading, however, to infer from this outcome that constitutional rights must have 
been the product of an instrumental calculus of electoral prospects or of a defensive 
strategy by a coalition of hegemonic, yet threatened, elites, of a conservative kind. At 
a time when cutting back on social provisions is no longer a choice, but a budgetary 
demand imposed by international lenders, Portuguese elites face a constraint on 
political choice much greater than the painstaking constitutional social provisions 
ever were. Judging from the Constitutional Court’s refraining from enforcing social 
welfare rights against governments, and from its bipartisan composition, as controlled 
by the two parties who bound themselves to the austerity program, it is highly 
unlikely that the Court will offer resistance to welfare retrenchment as its Hungarian 
counterpart did in the mid-1990s. But this will not free Portuguese elites, both 
political and judicial, from needing to act to meet a considerable challenge: to 
preserve their menaced legitimacy while rolling back the constitutionally protected 
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expectations of a people for whom democracy and social rights – which it took one 
generation to realize – are co-original and inseparable. Today, more than ever, real-
life constitutional politics in Portugal depends on getting rights right.    
 
 
